Tuesday, May 15, 2007
Democrat Congress- Approval Plunge Continues: All those who continue to believe the "country has turned anti-war" should take note of the latest Gallup Poll that shows the Congressional approval ratings continuing their plunge. Congressional approval is now below that of George W. Bush. The only thing Congress has done over the last several weeks has been to delay funding the troops in the field.
Source Link: http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=27589
And the article:
May 15, 2007
Congress Approval Down to 29%; Bush Approval Steady at 33%
Both ratings are slightly lower than 2007 averages
by Joseph Carroll
GALLUP NEWS SERVICE
PRINCETON, NJ -- A new Gallup Poll finds continued low levels of public support for both Congress and President George W. Bush. Twenty-nine percent of Americans approve of Congress, down slightly from last month's reading (33%) and this year's high point of 37%, while Bush's approval rating is holding steady at 33%. Both the ratings of Congress and the president are slightly lower than their respective 2007 averages. Approval ratings of Congress are higher among Democrats than Republicans, while Bush's ratings are much higher among Republicans.
Congressional Job Approval
According to the May 10-13, 2007, Gallup Poll, 29% of Americans approve and 64% disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job. Congressional approval is down 4 percentage points since last month, and is 3 points lower than the 32% average measured during the first five months of the year. The high point for the congressional approval rating so far this year was the 37% approval measured in February. Although ratings are quite low, Americans have been more positive in their assessments of Congress this year than last year, when an average of just 25% approved of Congress.
Even though Democrats now control both houses of Congress, the poll shows that only 37% of Democrats approve of the job Congress is doing right now. These marks are, however, significantly better than those given to Congress by independents (24%) and Republicans (25%). Democrats have been more likely than Republicans to approve of Congress this year, whereas Republicans expressed a higher level of approval prior to the change of power experienced after the midterm congressional elections in November 2006.
So far this year, Republicans' approval of Congress has gradually declined, from a high of 37% in mid-January to 25% in the latest poll. By comparison, ratings among Democrats have shown more fluctuation, ranging between 33% and 44% since January, and are down 6 points this month since early April. More generally, Democrats' ratings of the job the Democratic-controlled Congress is doing are down from a higher point of 44% in February, which is just after the control of Congress switched from the Republicans to the Democrats.
Presidential Job Approval
There has been little meaningful change in the public's rating of the president in quite some time. Thirty-three percent of Americans now approve of the way Bush is handling his job as president, while 62% disapprove. Bush's approval ratings have averaged 35% in 2007, and have fallen within a narrow range between 32% and 38%. Bush's ratings were slightly higher last year, averaging 38%. Bush has not received an approval rating above 40% in any Gallup polling since September 2006.
Republicans continue to be much more likely than independents or Democrats to support the president. Seventy-three percent of Republicans approve of Bush, substantially higher than the 27% approval among independents and the 9% approval among Democrats. Although the three party groups' ratings of Bush's job approval have been quite stable in recent months, since last May presidential approval ratings have shown somewhat more fluctuation among Republicans (ranging between 68% and 86%) than among independents (23% to 36%) or Democrats (4% to 15%).
Survey Methods
Results are based on telephone interviews with 1,003 national adults, aged 18 and older, conducted May 10-13, 2007. For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.
Source Link: http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=27589
And the article:
May 15, 2007
Congress Approval Down to 29%; Bush Approval Steady at 33%
Both ratings are slightly lower than 2007 averages
by Joseph Carroll
GALLUP NEWS SERVICE
PRINCETON, NJ -- A new Gallup Poll finds continued low levels of public support for both Congress and President George W. Bush. Twenty-nine percent of Americans approve of Congress, down slightly from last month's reading (33%) and this year's high point of 37%, while Bush's approval rating is holding steady at 33%. Both the ratings of Congress and the president are slightly lower than their respective 2007 averages. Approval ratings of Congress are higher among Democrats than Republicans, while Bush's ratings are much higher among Republicans.
Congressional Job Approval
According to the May 10-13, 2007, Gallup Poll, 29% of Americans approve and 64% disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job. Congressional approval is down 4 percentage points since last month, and is 3 points lower than the 32% average measured during the first five months of the year. The high point for the congressional approval rating so far this year was the 37% approval measured in February. Although ratings are quite low, Americans have been more positive in their assessments of Congress this year than last year, when an average of just 25% approved of Congress.
Even though Democrats now control both houses of Congress, the poll shows that only 37% of Democrats approve of the job Congress is doing right now. These marks are, however, significantly better than those given to Congress by independents (24%) and Republicans (25%). Democrats have been more likely than Republicans to approve of Congress this year, whereas Republicans expressed a higher level of approval prior to the change of power experienced after the midterm congressional elections in November 2006.
So far this year, Republicans' approval of Congress has gradually declined, from a high of 37% in mid-January to 25% in the latest poll. By comparison, ratings among Democrats have shown more fluctuation, ranging between 33% and 44% since January, and are down 6 points this month since early April. More generally, Democrats' ratings of the job the Democratic-controlled Congress is doing are down from a higher point of 44% in February, which is just after the control of Congress switched from the Republicans to the Democrats.
Presidential Job Approval
There has been little meaningful change in the public's rating of the president in quite some time. Thirty-three percent of Americans now approve of the way Bush is handling his job as president, while 62% disapprove. Bush's approval ratings have averaged 35% in 2007, and have fallen within a narrow range between 32% and 38%. Bush's ratings were slightly higher last year, averaging 38%. Bush has not received an approval rating above 40% in any Gallup polling since September 2006.
Republicans continue to be much more likely than independents or Democrats to support the president. Seventy-three percent of Republicans approve of Bush, substantially higher than the 27% approval among independents and the 9% approval among Democrats. Although the three party groups' ratings of Bush's job approval have been quite stable in recent months, since last May presidential approval ratings have shown somewhat more fluctuation among Republicans (ranging between 68% and 86%) than among independents (23% to 36%) or Democrats (4% to 15%).
Survey Methods
Results are based on telephone interviews with 1,003 national adults, aged 18 and older, conducted May 10-13, 2007. For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.
Labels: approval, Biden, Bush, Clinton, Congress, congressional, Democrats, Funding, Hillary, Hoyer, Iraq, Levin, Murtha, Obama, Pelosi, Poll, ratings, Reid, War
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
Democrats Illiterate on Iraq: Don't take my word for it. This is from The New Republic:
Congressional leaders are illiterate on Iraq.
Knowledge Gap
by Lawrence F. Kaplan Only at TNR OnlinePost date: 05.01.07
Source Link: http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w070430&s=kaplan050107
Whatever explains the literacy gap, this much at least is obvious: Having been called into being by politicians on both sides of the aisle, the war in Iraq no longer bears a relation to anything they say. You don't need to cherry-pick quotes to prove the point: Nearly every time a senator's mouth opens, something wrong comes out.
A typical example came a few weeks ago when Senator Joseph Biden took to the op-ed page of The Washington Post. In response to an equally surreal op-ed by Senator John McCain, Biden wrote,
"The most damning evidence that the "results" McCain cites are illusory is the city of Tall Afar. Architects of the president's plan called it a model because in 2005, a surge of about 10,000 Americans and Iraqis pacified the city. Then we left Tall Afar, just as our troops soon will leave the Baghdad neighborhoods that they have calmed."
A minor detail perhaps, but "we" never left Tal Afar. In 2006, the First Brigade of the First Armored Division replaced the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, actually boosting the number of Americans in the city. Biden's analysis will also come as news for the 25th Infantry Division, whose soldiers were patrolling the streets of Tal Afar even as the senator claimed otherwise.
Not to single Biden out: Who can forget Representative John Murtha's suggestion that it would be a cinch for American forces to "redeploy" from Iraq to nearby Okinawa, 5,000 miles from Baghdad? Or House Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes not knowing whether Sunni or Shia populate the ranks of Al Qaeda? U.S. officers in Iraq say that, during their briefings to visiting delegations, they routinely find themselves subjected to examples of congressional oversight along the lines of: Is (the northern city of) Mosul east or west of Baghdad? What's the difference between a brigade and battalion?
As to why some of Capitol Hill's would-be war managers can't name more than a single Iraqi province, officers and journalists offer all kinds of theories. A common explanation points to the shrinking percentage of veterans in Congress, which amounts to a paltry fraction of the World War II cohort that legislated the war in Vietnam (and, incidentally, did a lousy job).
But the ranks of the confused feature enough veterans, most notably Reid and Murtha, to disprove the theory. Another blames the reluctance of delegations to venture beyond the Green Zone or the bases they visit--and, then, their reluctance to be dazed by the sheer unfamiliarity of it all. "I'll never forget the helicopters coming in at night delivering wounded to the hospital in the Green Zone," the Iraq Study Group's Leon Panetta marveled to The Washington Post.
"We've all seen 'M.A.S.H.,' and yet it was happening right there." Which brings us to yet another explanation for the literacy gap: Today's wise men don't exactly rise to the level of their predecessors. In place of William Bundy and Walt Rostow, we have Panetta and Vernon Jordan; as the custodian of William Fulbright's legacy, we have Harry Reid. The former hungered for the data and lacuna of war; the latter seem frankly uninterested.
More than that, congressional leaders often seem loath even to hear about events on the ground. During General Petraeus's visit to Washington last week, for example, House Democrats at first denied the Iraq commander an opportunity to brief them, citing "scheduling conflicts." And, when he finally did brief Congress, the evidence of progress that Petraeus was expected to present was dismissed before he even offered it. "He's the commander," Senator Carl Levin reasoned. "We always know that commanders are optimistic about their policies." The joke here, of course, is that Levin and his colleagues were not so long ago denouncing the Bush administration--and rightly so--for the sin of disparaging military expertise. True, civilians have no obligation to heed that expertise. They do, however, have an obligation to be informed or, at a minimum, to listen.
But, then, expertise may be beside the point. Obliviousness, after all, has its uses. It comforts the sensibilities of politicians whose varying levels of awareness allow them to favor certain facts and not others. Obliviousness testifies to the virtue and good intentions of members of Congress who, in truth, couldn't care less what comes next in Iraq. It invites Americans to indulge in the conceit that what happens in Washington obviates the need to think seriously about what happens in Baghdad.
Most of all, illiteracy makes for good politics. There is the conviction, to paraphrase McCain, that winning a war takes precedence over winning an election. But it isn't so clear that this conviction guides a partisan brawl in which the Senate majority leader can gush, "We're going to pick up Senate seats as a result of this war." In such an environment, the subordination of facts to politics inform matters small and large, from the relatively trivial question of whether U.S. troops still operate in Tal Afar to enormous questions regarding the future of the U.S. enterprise in Iraq.
hese big questions, of course, are where literacy matters most--and where you won't find a trace of it. Consider a speech last week by Reid, who neatly summarized the strategic logic behind legislation mandating a timeline for withdrawal from Iraq. Speaking of "where things stand on the ground in Iraq," Reid insisted that the role of U.S. forces is to train Iraqi security forces, protect U.S. troops, and conduct targeted counterterrorism operations.
This transitions our mission to one that is aligned with U.S. strategic interests, while at the same time reducing our combat footprint. U.S. troops should not be interjecting themselves between warring factions, kicking down doors, trying to sort Shia from Sunni, friend from foe.
There are several problems with this formulation, not the least of which is that, far from being a "new strategy," it mirrors exactly the approach that was tested and found wanting when Donald Rumsfeld was presiding over the war and "reducing our combat footprint" was a raison d'être. Chaos, not stability, was the result.
Still, the idea dovetails neatly with Reid's insistence that it is "the specter of U.S. occupation [that] gives fuel to the insurgency"--and that, absent this specter, the violence will magically subside. But just the reverse has been true. Falluja and Tal Afar in 2004, Ramadi in 2005, Western Baghdad in 2006--these places became charnel houses when U.S. forces pulled back. The suggestion, moreover, that American forces ought to confine themselves to "targeted counter-terror operations" rather than trying to sort "friend from foe" misunderstands the most basic tenets of counterinsurgency, ignores the lessons of the past four years, and purposefully slights the testimony of Petraeus and his fellow experts. Living among the population and sorting "friend from foe" is precisely how the military generates intelligence tips, which, in turn, provide the key to "targeted counter-terror operations." It can't be done from Kuwait, and it can't be done from Okinawa.
Though Reid has no use for the Bush administration's military "surge," he does propose a "surge in diplomacy," in line with the cliché that the war has no military solution. As The Washington Post's David Broder has pointed out, "Instead of reinforcing the important proposition ... that a military strategy for Iraq is necessary but not sufficient to solve the myriad political problems of that country, Reid has mistakenly argued that the military effort is lost but a diplomatic-political strategy can succeed."
Nor is this the only reason to doubt the reasoning behind Reid's "diplomatic surge." To begin with, even if they were inclined to assist the American cause in Iraq, neither Iran nor Syria have much, if any, sway over Al Qaeda. Moreover, the violence in Iraq has its own, wholly internal logic. In fact, the one brand of diplomacy that truly matters in Iraq--the U.S. Army's tribal diplomacy, which accounts for the recent turn-around in Anbar Province--is precisely the mission that Reid's demand for a skeleton force would shut down.
Where all this leads is clear. Piece together a string of demonstrably false "facts on the ground" from a suitably safe remove, and you're left with a scenario where we can walk away from Iraq without condition and regardless of consequence. You don't need to watch terrified Iraqis pleading for American forces to stay put in their neighborhoods. You don't need to read the latest National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which anticipates that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal will end in catastrophe. Why, in the serene conviction that things are the other way around, you don't even need to read at all. Chances are, your congressman doesn't either.
Lawrence F. Kaplan is a senior editor at The New Republic.
Congressional leaders are illiterate on Iraq.
Knowledge Gap
by Lawrence F. Kaplan Only at TNR OnlinePost date: 05.01.07
Source Link: http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w070430&s=kaplan050107
Whatever explains the literacy gap, this much at least is obvious: Having been called into being by politicians on both sides of the aisle, the war in Iraq no longer bears a relation to anything they say. You don't need to cherry-pick quotes to prove the point: Nearly every time a senator's mouth opens, something wrong comes out.
A typical example came a few weeks ago when Senator Joseph Biden took to the op-ed page of The Washington Post. In response to an equally surreal op-ed by Senator John McCain, Biden wrote,
"The most damning evidence that the "results" McCain cites are illusory is the city of Tall Afar. Architects of the president's plan called it a model because in 2005, a surge of about 10,000 Americans and Iraqis pacified the city. Then we left Tall Afar, just as our troops soon will leave the Baghdad neighborhoods that they have calmed."
A minor detail perhaps, but "we" never left Tal Afar. In 2006, the First Brigade of the First Armored Division replaced the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, actually boosting the number of Americans in the city. Biden's analysis will also come as news for the 25th Infantry Division, whose soldiers were patrolling the streets of Tal Afar even as the senator claimed otherwise.
Not to single Biden out: Who can forget Representative John Murtha's suggestion that it would be a cinch for American forces to "redeploy" from Iraq to nearby Okinawa, 5,000 miles from Baghdad? Or House Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes not knowing whether Sunni or Shia populate the ranks of Al Qaeda? U.S. officers in Iraq say that, during their briefings to visiting delegations, they routinely find themselves subjected to examples of congressional oversight along the lines of: Is (the northern city of) Mosul east or west of Baghdad? What's the difference between a brigade and battalion?
As to why some of Capitol Hill's would-be war managers can't name more than a single Iraqi province, officers and journalists offer all kinds of theories. A common explanation points to the shrinking percentage of veterans in Congress, which amounts to a paltry fraction of the World War II cohort that legislated the war in Vietnam (and, incidentally, did a lousy job).
But the ranks of the confused feature enough veterans, most notably Reid and Murtha, to disprove the theory. Another blames the reluctance of delegations to venture beyond the Green Zone or the bases they visit--and, then, their reluctance to be dazed by the sheer unfamiliarity of it all. "I'll never forget the helicopters coming in at night delivering wounded to the hospital in the Green Zone," the Iraq Study Group's Leon Panetta marveled to The Washington Post.
"We've all seen 'M.A.S.H.,' and yet it was happening right there." Which brings us to yet another explanation for the literacy gap: Today's wise men don't exactly rise to the level of their predecessors. In place of William Bundy and Walt Rostow, we have Panetta and Vernon Jordan; as the custodian of William Fulbright's legacy, we have Harry Reid. The former hungered for the data and lacuna of war; the latter seem frankly uninterested.
More than that, congressional leaders often seem loath even to hear about events on the ground. During General Petraeus's visit to Washington last week, for example, House Democrats at first denied the Iraq commander an opportunity to brief them, citing "scheduling conflicts." And, when he finally did brief Congress, the evidence of progress that Petraeus was expected to present was dismissed before he even offered it. "He's the commander," Senator Carl Levin reasoned. "We always know that commanders are optimistic about their policies." The joke here, of course, is that Levin and his colleagues were not so long ago denouncing the Bush administration--and rightly so--for the sin of disparaging military expertise. True, civilians have no obligation to heed that expertise. They do, however, have an obligation to be informed or, at a minimum, to listen.
But, then, expertise may be beside the point. Obliviousness, after all, has its uses. It comforts the sensibilities of politicians whose varying levels of awareness allow them to favor certain facts and not others. Obliviousness testifies to the virtue and good intentions of members of Congress who, in truth, couldn't care less what comes next in Iraq. It invites Americans to indulge in the conceit that what happens in Washington obviates the need to think seriously about what happens in Baghdad.
Most of all, illiteracy makes for good politics. There is the conviction, to paraphrase McCain, that winning a war takes precedence over winning an election. But it isn't so clear that this conviction guides a partisan brawl in which the Senate majority leader can gush, "We're going to pick up Senate seats as a result of this war." In such an environment, the subordination of facts to politics inform matters small and large, from the relatively trivial question of whether U.S. troops still operate in Tal Afar to enormous questions regarding the future of the U.S. enterprise in Iraq.
hese big questions, of course, are where literacy matters most--and where you won't find a trace of it. Consider a speech last week by Reid, who neatly summarized the strategic logic behind legislation mandating a timeline for withdrawal from Iraq. Speaking of "where things stand on the ground in Iraq," Reid insisted that the role of U.S. forces is to train Iraqi security forces, protect U.S. troops, and conduct targeted counterterrorism operations.
This transitions our mission to one that is aligned with U.S. strategic interests, while at the same time reducing our combat footprint. U.S. troops should not be interjecting themselves between warring factions, kicking down doors, trying to sort Shia from Sunni, friend from foe.
There are several problems with this formulation, not the least of which is that, far from being a "new strategy," it mirrors exactly the approach that was tested and found wanting when Donald Rumsfeld was presiding over the war and "reducing our combat footprint" was a raison d'être. Chaos, not stability, was the result.
Still, the idea dovetails neatly with Reid's insistence that it is "the specter of U.S. occupation [that] gives fuel to the insurgency"--and that, absent this specter, the violence will magically subside. But just the reverse has been true. Falluja and Tal Afar in 2004, Ramadi in 2005, Western Baghdad in 2006--these places became charnel houses when U.S. forces pulled back. The suggestion, moreover, that American forces ought to confine themselves to "targeted counter-terror operations" rather than trying to sort "friend from foe" misunderstands the most basic tenets of counterinsurgency, ignores the lessons of the past four years, and purposefully slights the testimony of Petraeus and his fellow experts. Living among the population and sorting "friend from foe" is precisely how the military generates intelligence tips, which, in turn, provide the key to "targeted counter-terror operations." It can't be done from Kuwait, and it can't be done from Okinawa.
Though Reid has no use for the Bush administration's military "surge," he does propose a "surge in diplomacy," in line with the cliché that the war has no military solution. As The Washington Post's David Broder has pointed out, "Instead of reinforcing the important proposition ... that a military strategy for Iraq is necessary but not sufficient to solve the myriad political problems of that country, Reid has mistakenly argued that the military effort is lost but a diplomatic-political strategy can succeed."
Nor is this the only reason to doubt the reasoning behind Reid's "diplomatic surge." To begin with, even if they were inclined to assist the American cause in Iraq, neither Iran nor Syria have much, if any, sway over Al Qaeda. Moreover, the violence in Iraq has its own, wholly internal logic. In fact, the one brand of diplomacy that truly matters in Iraq--the U.S. Army's tribal diplomacy, which accounts for the recent turn-around in Anbar Province--is precisely the mission that Reid's demand for a skeleton force would shut down.
Where all this leads is clear. Piece together a string of demonstrably false "facts on the ground" from a suitably safe remove, and you're left with a scenario where we can walk away from Iraq without condition and regardless of consequence. You don't need to watch terrified Iraqis pleading for American forces to stay put in their neighborhoods. You don't need to read the latest National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which anticipates that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal will end in catastrophe. Why, in the serene conviction that things are the other way around, you don't even need to read at all. Chances are, your congressman doesn't either.
Lawrence F. Kaplan is a senior editor at The New Republic.
Labels: Biden, Congress, Democrats, illiterate, Iraq, Murtha, Okinawa, Pelosi, Reid, War
